logo

We Could Use a Man Like Grover Cleveland Again

On January 20, 2025, Donald Trump will join Grover Cleveland as one of only two American presidents to serve nonconsecutive terms. Like Cleveland, Trump won his second election due largely to the fact that his predecessor presided over a poor economy. But Trump does not seem to recognize this, treating his victory as a sweeping mandate to impose a wide range of nationalist policies.

Unfortunately for opponents of both imperialism and the military-industrial complex, these policies include a spirit of outright acquisitiveness for other sovereign lands. This is why Cleveland’s career is especially relevant today.

Trump says that America should own Greenland as an “absolute necessity,” even though its more than 50,000 residents have given no indication of wanting to be under American sovereignty. He similarly lusts over the Panama Canal, which Panama is no more likely to cede to full American control than Denmark is to peacefully relinquish Greenland. Even closer to home, he’s made comments about making Canada America’s 51st state.

Even if Trump utterly fails in these geopolitical gambits, the fact that he is trying in the first place shows his hand. In his second term, Trump plans on using his executive powers to expand America’s global empire. By contrast, Cleveland spent his second term trying to roll back America’s then-nascent imperialist ambitions—and did so without flinching when genuine strength in our foreign policy was needed.

The standout story from Cleveland’s presidency involves Hawaii. When he returned to office in 1893, Cleveland was greeted with a treaty that had been presented to the Senate for the annexation of Hawaii. Newspapers across the land waxed poetic about how the American flag would soon wave in the Hawaiian breeze, but few journalists questioned the official story about how this land had come into our possession. They were told the Hawaiian natives had willingly betrayed their own monarch, Queen Liliuokalani, by replacing her rule with that of white foreigners (mostly Americans).

Cleveland suspected there was more to it. He knew that sugar plantation owners and other wealthy business interests were suspicious of Liliuokalani, who wanted to reduce foreign influence in her country. Once those Americans learned she was planning concrete policies toward achieving this goal, American jurist Sanford Dole and U.S. Minister to Hawaii John Stevens led a conspiracy to dethrone her. By the time Cleveland took office, they had succeeded in doing so (with the unwitting aid of American locals who believed they had support from Washington) and were only awaiting the Senate’s ratification of an annexation treaty to consummate their plot.

Cleveland rebuffed the conspirators. First, he appointed former Rep. James H. Blount (D–Ga.) to visit the islands and investigate the coup. After Blount confirmed Cleveland’s hunch—that the queen had been overthrown through violence and against the will of the Hawaiian natives—the president sent emissaries to Hawaii saying they would help her regain power as long as she promised to neither execute nor otherwise excessively punish the Americans who had ruled since she was deposed. Cleveland insisted upon these points at the urging of Secretary of State Richard Olney, who pointed out that America still had an obligation to protect the rights of citizens who had acted according to plans they had been led to believe were fully condoned by their own government.

While Liliuokalani was grateful to Cleveland for his support, she informed his emissaries that she had to follow Hawaiian customs. In cases of treason, the traditional laws were clear: The guilty parties had to be executed, and everyone connected with them would have all of their property confiscated.

Because Liliuokalani took this stand, the next four years of Cleveland’s presidency turned into a stalemate. Despite eventually relenting in aspects of her hardline position, Liliuokalani nevertheless held firm that she could not be restored to power without inflicting some measure of punishment on the Americans who currently resided in her domain. As a strict constitutionalist, Cleveland referred the entire matter to Congress for resolution. This caused the matter to languish without resolution until 1897, when Cleveland’s second term ended. His successor, William McKinley, did not share his qualms about annexing Hawaii, and before the end of the 19th century, the deed was done.

This was not the only occasion when Cleveland stood up to American imperialism. When the final Cuban insurrection against the Spanish empire broke out in 1895, millions of Americans—whipped up by newspapers—clamored for America to simultaneously liberate its neighbor and flex its military muscles. Cleveland did not yield to these calls, displaying a strength of character that his successor lacked. Just as McKinley relented to the annexationists and acquired Hawaii, he folded to the imperialists and in 1898 launched America into the Spanish-American War despite his reservations. Most foreign policy historians regard McKinley’s decision to start the Spanish-American War to be the beginning of America’s status as a modern world power.

Cleveland never wanted America to become a global power, but that does not mean he was weak. When the British Empire threatened to bully Venezuela into accepting an unfair resolution of a boundary dispute in 1895, Cleveland reminded the British that such actions would violate America’s Monroe Doctrine. Declared in 1823, the Monroe Doctrine asserted that the United States would not peacefully submit to any nation in our hemisphere having its territorial integrity violated by outsiders, therefore considering an attack on any Western Hemisphere country to be an attack on all of them. Cleveland was ultimately successful in pressuring Britain to agree to peaceful arbitration with a warning—one America should bear in mind, especially in light of rumors that Trump will abandon our alliance with Ukraine to curry favor with Russia’s imperialist president, Vladimir Putin. As Cleveland stated in his annual address to Congress:

“There is no calamity which a great nation can invite which equals that which follows a supine submission to wrong and injustice and the consequent loss of national self-respect and honor, beneath which are shielded and defended a people’s safety and greatness.”

This was not the only time when Cleveland defied a powerful empire to protect American values. At the beginning of his first term, the Austro-Hungarian empire refused to accept Cleveland’s appointed ambassador, Anthony M. Keiley, because his wife was Jewish and therefore was considered socially unacceptable among the Viennese upper crust. Instead of acceding to Austro-Hungary’s request that he appoint two gentiles in Keiley’s stead, Cleveland left the post vacant through his entire first term, explaining in his 1885 State of the Union message that he refused to agree to “an application of a religious test as a qualification for office under the United States as would have resulted in the practical disfranchisement of a large class of our citizens and the abandonment of a vital principle in our Government.”

There is a crucial difference between showing strength over matters of principle and abusing that same strength for self-glorification. Cleveland demonstrated a wise and discerning ability to recognize this difference, being strong when matters of principle were genuinely involved and otherwise deferring to the rights of other countries. He did this both because he believed the laws that govern individual relations should be extrapolated on the international level and because, on a deeper level, he was suspicious of geopolitical greed.

This is why, as Americans and the rest of the world prepare for Trump’s geopolitical aspirations, we should think of Cleveland’s wisdom. He best articulated it when rejecting the Hawaiian annexation treaty:

“I suppose that right and justice should determine the path to be followed in treating this subject,” Cleveland said. “If national honesty is to be disregarded and a desire for territorial extension or dissatisfaction with a form of government not our own ought to regulate our conduct, I have entirely misapprehended the mission and character of our Government and the behavior which the conscience of our people demands of their public servants.”

The post We Could Use a Man Like Grover Cleveland Again appeared first on Reason.com.

Originally from Reason.com

Trump vs. Cleveland: A Tale of Two Tariff Strategies

Donald Trump will soon become the second president to serve non-consecutive terms. Naturally, this invites comparison between Trump and the first president to serve non-consecutive terms, Grover Cleveland. In one crucial respect that juxtaposition is both instructive and cruelly ironic.

Trump has made raising tariffs a centerpiece of his economic agenda. Cleveland, by contrast, devoted his career to warning that high tariffs bring a specific and dangerous type of communism to America—a communism of pelf.

“Pelf” is a term for money acquired in a dishonest or dishonorable way, and while it may seem anachronistic, it is the perfect word to capture Cleveland’s ideas. As he explained in a frustrated 1894 letter to Mississippi Rep. Thomas Catchings, “The trusts and combinations—the communism of pelf—whose machinations have prevented us from reaching the success we deserved, should not be forgotten nor forgiven.” Yet his most consequential statement on tariff reform was a State of the Union message submitted to Congress on Dec. 6, 1887—exactly 137 years from the date of this article’s publication.

Cleveland believed so strongly in tariff reform that, because of that State of the Union, he was able to dedicate his entire 1888 reelection campaign to the cause of lowering them. He lost that election in a controversial squeaker, but was decisively reelected in 1892 in no small part because economic events had vindicated his warnings.

When tariffs are too high, Cleveland argued, it means that corrupt politicians and businessmen are able to exploit consumers, often imposing severe hardships through price increases. Just as bad, it means that the government is failing to treat all citizens as equal before the law, instead picking winners and losers in the aforementioned “communism of pelf.”

This was the situation that existed in America during and after the Civil War, when politicians imposed weighty tariffs under the pretext of supporting the nation’s burgeoning business community. While American consumers initially accepted the additional taxation as a wartime necessity, the high rates persisted even after the nascent military-industrial complex had been wound down.

The problem was both simple and intractable: There were thousands of manufacturing, industrial, agricultural, and other business interests that profited from high tariffs. Each special interest group disregarded the national welfare to protect themselves, and as a result, the government accumulated massive surpluses—$113 million in 1886–1887 alone.

Despite this growing crisis, initially, Cleveland did not prioritize tariff reform. For the first two-and-a-half years after taking office in 1885, Cleveland concentrated on rooting out government corruption, which had reached such a nadir that in 1873 Mark Twain dubbed the post-Civil War era as a “Gilded Age.” To the extent that Cleveland’s anti-corruption agenda involved vetoing legislation he deemed financially wasteful, he indirectly picked off some of the rotten fruits that grew from the protectionist tree. However, it was not until 1887 that he shifted his attention to a need for sweeping tariff reform. When he did, he transformed the presidency and America in the process.

“Our progress toward a wise conclusion will not be improved by dwelling upon the theories of protection and free trade,” Cleveland wrote in his message to Congress, alluding to the various nationalistic arguments made by the protectionists. “It is a condition which confronts us, not a theory.” From there, Cleveland proposed moderate tariff reductions, focusing on increasing access to raw materials for ordinary consumers and adding the federal government’s financial obligations could be met through internal revenue taxes levied on luxury items (particularly “tobacco and spirituous and malt liquors”).

In the long term, the message was good news for America, as the 1887 State of the Union completely dominated national politics for the next year. In the process, Cleveland strengthened the office of the presidency, which had become weak in shaping policy in the more than two decades since the Civil War. Of equal importance, he raised awareness about a grave economic injustice. Finally, Cleveland gave the Democratic Party a new sense of identity after nearly a quarter-century of post-Civil War ennui. Democrats who did not support tariff reform were no longer viewed as proper Democrats; the same was true for Republicans but in reverse, as practically overnight they redefined themselves around the cause of protectionism.

In the short term, though, the message had negative results. Cleveland’s tariff reform proposals passed the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives but failed in the Republican-controlled Senate. Even worse, despite winning the popular vote, Cleveland lost the 1888 election to Republican nominee Benjamin Harrison amid Electoral College disputes in the key states of New York and Indiana. (Unlike Trump, Cleveland accepted his defeat with grace and peacefully ended his term in 1889.) The Republicans took office and passed a high tariff law (framed by future president William McKinley, then an Ohio congressman). The McKinley tariffs raised the average duty on imports by almost 50 percent, and as Dartmouth University economist Douglas Irwin demonstrated in 1998, these tariffs did little to stimulate the economy even as they imposed considerable suffering on low-income Americans.

This is why, just like Trump, Cleveland was able to comfortably get elected to a non-consecutive term by promising to lower prices. The key difference is that, unlike Trump, Cleveland proposed an intelligent solution to the problem—lowering tariffs, not raising them.

Unfortunately for both Cleveland and the Americans of his time, he would not live to see his vision for tariff reform realized. America plunged into an economic depression shortly after he took office in 1893, compelling Cleveland to confront a number of unrelated crises before he could get to tariff reform. By the time a tariff bill did reach his desk in 1894, special interest groups in both parties had diluted it almost to meaninglessness. Cleveland couldn’t bring himself to veto the Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act of 1894, and he only allowed it to become law without his signature. Adding insult to injury, McKinley and the Republicans politically benefited from the economic misery they’d helped cause, with Democrats getting blamed for the depression because of their incumbency and McKinley winning the 1896 presidential election in a major realignment.

Tariff reform along the lines Cleveland advocated would not become the law of the land until the Underwood-Simmons Act of 1913, which was promoted with far more political effectiveness by Woodrow Wilson, the first Democratic president to serve after Cleveland’s administration. By then, Cleveland had been dead for five years.

Yet, Cleveland’s tariff reform message was not a failure. In addition to putting himself on the right side of history, Cleveland offered a potent and timeless warning about the dangers of protectionism.

“When we consider that the theory of our institutions guarantees to every citizen the full enjoyment of all the fruits of his industry and enterprise, with only such deduction as may be his share toward the careful and economical maintenance of the Government which protects him, it is plain that the exaction of more than this is indefensible extortion and a culpable betrayal of American fairness and justice,” Cleveland wrote. “This wrong inflicted upon those who bear the burden of national taxation, like other wrongs, multiplies a brood of evil consequences.”

The post Trump vs. Cleveland: A Tale of Two Tariff Strategies appeared first on Reason.com.

Originally from Reason.com